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the cause of a hernia" in Foose." Finally the court said, "[T]he
medical testimony of the surgeon does not stand alone but is supported by other evidence relating to the condition before the collision and the prior absence of a hernia." 5 Thus the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that expert testimony stating there was a
possibility of causation supported by other evidence could be
sufficient to establish a causal relationship.
In considering the quantity and quality of expert medical testimony necessary to establish a causal relation, the courts have taken
various paths. Probability is accepted by all and required by some,
although there are different standards by which it is constituted.
Testimony of mere possibility alone is not sufficient, but, when
coupled with other evidence, it is sometimes enough to take the
question of causation to the jury. This other evidence requirement
is generally satisfied by a factual sequence of events in support of
the possibility testimony of the expert. Earlier the West Virginia
court seems to have required probability as a basis for establishing
the causal relationship. The more recent decisions of State v. Evans
and Pygman v. Helton seem to dictate that West Virginia is following the line of cases which permit causal relationship to be
established by the expert's possibility testimony when supported
by other evidence.
Linda L. Hupp

Insurance-Recovery of Excess Judgment from
Insurance Company
X obtained a judgment against P, plaintiff, in excess of P's
liability policy limits. P sued D, his insurer, to recover the excess
alleging that D had exercised "bad faith" in failing to settle the
claim within the policy limits. The trial court allowed recovery of
the excess. Held, reversed. In holding that the evidence did not
support the verdict for P,the court stated that, as a matter of law,
D was guilty of neither negligence nor bad faith in not settling
with the injured party. Speicher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insrance Company, 151 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1966).
3

287, 134 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 288, 134 S.E.2d at 722. Here the court cited with approval
Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Sons, 129 Me. 165, 151 A. 197 (1933) listing the
4 Id. at

3-

factual sequence of iat case, and thus endorsing the possibility-plus doctrine.
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By holding that the evidence did not support the verdict for the
plaintiff, the court was not confronted with the problem of choosing
between the two general tests advanced for finding a violation of
duty owed by the insurer to the insured when there is a judgment
in excess of policy limits. The courts, in this type case, have found
liability on the insurer for either making a "bad faith" refusal to
settle or being "negligent" in failing to reach a settlement.'
The test of good or bad faith rests on the idea that the insurance
company has assumed control of the defense and of the right to
settling claims, and may be liable in excess of policy limits if the
failure to settle was in "bad faith."2 The negligence test holds the
insurer liable for an excess judgment where the insurer negligently
rejected a settlement offer.3 By comparing the general statements
of the two tests, it appears that the negligence approach imposes a
more stringent standard of conduct upon the insurer.
An insurance company has the duty to defend and "may make
such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as
it deems expedient."4 The insurance company is trying to obtain the
discharge of its obligation "at the most economical price possible,
through honorable and legal means." It is under no duty to settle
or compromise simply for the benefit of the insured as long as
the insurer believes it has a reasonably fair prospect of escaping
liability.6 All that is required is that the insurer give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.7
The negligence test for finding a breach of these duties is based
on the tort theory that once someone acts, he must do so with the
care of an ordinary prudent man. A landmark decision on the
negligence test was Dumas v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
' The majority of jurisdictions follow the bad faith rule. Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 168, 178 (1955).
2 14 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA ON INSURANCE § 51:130 (2d ed. R.Anderson
1965); 7A J.APPLEMA, INSURANCE LAW AD PRACTIcE § 4712 (repl. 1962).
3 G. Coucin, supra note 2, at § 51:132; J. APPL -EAN,supra note 2, at
§ 4713.
4A standard provision quoted in the cases which comes from the automobile
liability insurance policy involved.
5
Demer, The Views of an Insurance Company Claims Attorney, 66
DiCK. L. Rv. 119, 121 (1961).
6 Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668, 250 S.W.2d
785,790
(1952).
7
Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317, 326 (D. Mont. 1962); Farmers
Ins. Exchange v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 338, 313 P.2d 404, 406 (1957);
see Garcia & Diaz, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 147 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308
(1955); Roos, A Note on the Excess Problem, 350 INs. L.J. 192, 195 (1952).
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Co.,' which decided that such claims should be based on negligence
since the company must use "due care and diligence" in finding out
the facts of the case, in learning the law, and considering whether or
not to settle. The thrust of the decision was that "the caution of the
ordinary person of average prudence should be employed."9
Another standard which has been applied by this approach was
that the insurer should exercise the degree of care and diligence,
in determining whether to settle, which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business.'" The
negligence test has been misused," and the fact that this test is
very difficult in application' 2 has caused it to be rejected in some
jurisdictions.' 3
In considering the cases which have applied the bad faith
approach, a common element throughout seems to be that the
insurer should not be held to further liability simply because it
ultimately turns out that the judgment exercised in refusing to
settle was mistaken." This approach reasons that since the parties
agree by contract to the policy limits, the duty owed to the insured
is read into the agreement and therefore the obligation of the
insurer should not be extended beyond the duty of good faith.
The insurer insures up to a certain amount, the limit set by insured
and for which he pays premiums, and it is a big penalty to hold the
insurer liable for a larger sum. It is therefore reasoned that substantial culpability, bad faith, should be involved.'"
8 94

N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).

9 Id. at 489, 56 A.2d at 60. This case was largely based on 8
mAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTcE §§ 4712-13 (1942) which

J. A prithe case

quotes as saying the negligence rule is in the majority. This work has since
been revised and no longer holds to this proposition. 7A J.APPLEMAN, supra
note 2, presently says there is little difference in the results of the two tests.
'o G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544,
547 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
" See Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.
1965). In this case the court applied what they called the negligence test,
but since the injuries were substantial, the settlement offered by plaintiff was
reasonable, and the liability of the insured looked certain, the decision appeared to be based on bad faith.
12 Epps and Chappell, Insurer's Liability in Excess of Policy Limits: Some
Aspects of the Problem, 44 VA. L. REV. 267, 271 (1958).
' See Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 247
N.Y. 451, 456, 160 N.E. 911, 912 (1928); Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Wash. 2d 624, 639, 117 P.2d 644, 650 (1941).
Co., 10
' 4 See Wong and Marr v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. (Sup. Ct.
of City and County of San Francisco sitting as a nisi prius ct. 1948) cited in
v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888, 890 (N.D. Cal.
Christian
1950).19 Brown
v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 688, 319 P.2d 69,
74 (1957).
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Some of the fact situations which courts have considered to
constitute bad faith on the part of the insurer are: when the
company has not given due regard to the recommendations of its
trial counsel,' 6 when the severity of plaintiff's injury is such that
any verdict against the insured is likely to be greatly in excess of
policy limits,'" "when the facts in the case indicate that a defendant's verdict on the issue of liability is doubtful,"'" when there
is a failure to investigate properly and ascertain the facts, 9 and
when the settlement offer was equal to policy limits and the
insurer failed to consider it because he stood to lose very little.2"
Perhaps there is no difference in the two approaches. In discussing this problem Appleman"' says that even though a difference
in language exists between the two tests, the same result would
be reached using either. He concludes that the question is essentially, "Did the insurer exercise that degree of skill, judgment,
and consideration for the welfare of the insured which it, as a
skilled professional defender of lawsuits having sole charge of the
investigation, settlement, and trial of the suit may have been ex22. It has been said that the difference between
pected to utilize . ""
the bad faith rule and the negligence rule is merely a matter of
methods of expression 3 and the results reached are the same.24
More recent cases point to the fact that the two doctrines are
merging and that an insurance company must exercise good faith
in its decision on whether or not to settle, and not be negligent
in the investigation of the facts of the case. 5
In an exhaustive study of the excess verdict problem, Keeton26
says that the bad faith rule recognizes that ordinary care must be
16Royal Transit Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.
1948),7 cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948).
' Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.
N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961).
18 Id.
19Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 304,
157 A.2d 319, 322 (1960).
20See Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Reville, 97 Ga. App. 888, 891, 104
S.E.2d 643, 645 (1958).
21 7A J. APPLE AN, supranote 2, at §§ 4712-13.
22

Id.at 562.

Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 H~av.
L. Rv.
1136, 1141 (1954).
2
4 Comment, 48 MicH L. REv. 95, 100 (1949).
2
SGaskill v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.Supp. 66, 68 (D. Md.
1966); Sweeten Adm'r v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 233 Md. 52, 55, 194 A.2d
23

817, 818 (1963); Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 12, 235

N.W. 413,415 (1931).
26 Keeton, supra note 23.
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exercised in defending a case, and that the investigation is a part
of the defense, and therefore negligence in investigation is an
element to be considered even in a bad faith jurisdiction. He
concludes that with the jury system determining the final verdict
there seems to be little difference in result when either test is
employed in a specific situation.2 7
A recent Virginia case, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v.
Price,28 decided that the good faith test rather than the negligence
test would be applied in that jurisdiction. Although this was an
excess judgment case for refusing to settle a malpractice claim,
the court relied upon an automobile liability case for precedent. 9
The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia has
recently decided an excess judgment case applying the "good faith"
test." In the opinion the court speaks of both the bad faith and
negligence tests, but good faith is specifically stated as the proper
test. The insurer "may become liable in excess of its undertakings
under the policy provisions if it fails to exercise 'good faith' in
considering offers to compromise the claim for an amount within
the policy limits."3 1
The West Virginia Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law,32 while
applicable only to that portion of the policy required by law for
financial security following an automobile accident, is pertinent
when considering which approach West Virginia should follow.
It states that a company can discharge its legal obligations for the
amount of the policy covered by the act by a good faith settlement.
This statement of public policy should be persuasive authority
upon the West Virginia court when it must choose between the
two tests.
7 Id. at 1142. Keeton states further that the real division of authority in
the courts may be in defining the duty to settle, and in what weight the
company must give to its own interests and to those of the insured.
28 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
29 Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 157
A.2d 319 (1960). This case held that good faith must be used in dealing with
offers of compromise, and that a diligent effort must be made to ascertain
upon which to base a good faith judgment.
the facts
30
Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.
W. Va. 1957), a-'d on rehearing,251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1958).
31Id. at 513.
32W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 4, § 12(f)(3) (Michie 1966) provides:
"The insurance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the
policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount thereof shall
be deductible from the limits of liability .... ." (emphasis added).
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Before a liability insurance company can be held liable in excess
of policy limits, it must be guilty of either "negligence" or "bad
faith" in refusing to settle within the policy limits. Although these
are theoretically two separate tests, in practical application the
results may be very similar. Since the Virginia court"s and the
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,34 along
with the West Virginia Legislature in the Safety Responsibility
Law"5 have all endorsed the "good faith" rule, it is most likely
that when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is confronted with the question they will follow the majority and require
that refusal to settle be a "good faith" refusal.
RichardEdwin Rowe

Juvenile Delinquency-Jurisdiction-Double Jeopardy
A juvenile, properly confined by the Juvenile Court of Ohio
County to the West Virginia Industrial School for Boys for automobile theft and breaking and entering, was placed in the Taylor
County jail because of misconduct at the school. Juvenile Court
of Ohio County ordered the youth returned to it whereupon he was
transferred, apparently without hearing, to the Intermediate Court
of Ohio County. Upon indictment and plea of guilty to auto theft,
he was placed on probation. Later he violated probation and
was sentenced to the penitentiary. Petitioner successfully sought a
writ of habeas corpus from Marshall County Circuit Court alleging
unlawful and illegal detention. The warden of the state penitentiary brought error. Held, reversed. The Intermediate Court
of Ohio County had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
petitioner waived his right to object to the jurisdiction over his
person by remaining silent. Validity of conviction is not dependent
upon how one gets before the court and double jeopardy is inapplicable in juvenile court proceedings. Brooks v. Boles, 153 S.E.2d
526 (W. Va. 1967).
The West Virginia Code provides that the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court over one adjudged to be a delinquent continues
3Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
34lnland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.
W. Va. 1957), aff'd on rehearing,251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1958).
35 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 4, § 12(f)(3) (Michie 1966).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss1/14

6

